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BARACK OBAMA’S EMANCIPATION
PROCLAMATION: AN ESSAY IN MEMORY OF
JUDGE RICHARD D. CUDAHY*
Jack M. Beermann**
When Judge Richard D. Cudahy passed away in September 2015,
the legal world lost a quiet judicial giant.  Judge Cudahy was not
flashy.  His opinions rarely, if ever, contained headline-grabbing pro-
nouncements.  He confined his attention to the proper universe of the
appellate judge, basing his opinions on the record before him and the
decision of the tribunal whose decision was being appealed, whether it
was a lower court or an administrative agency.  In his quiet way, he
embodied a judicial philosophy characterized by wisdom, common
sense, and humanity.  Judge Cudahy consistently interpreted and ap-
plied the law in light of its implications for the people involved, with
special solicitude for those whose relative social powerlessness led
them to look to the legal system for justice.
Judge Cudahy offered the clearest pronouncement of his judicial
philosophy in an essay he wrote in honor of Justice William Brennan
of the Supreme Court of the United States.1  In that essay, Judge
Cudahy wrote:
[I]n the long run the judges who invoke a measure of intuition and
passion are somehow more likely to benefit the powerless than the
powerful. . . . [P]erhaps this is merely an illustration of flawed induc-
tion from my own life experiences.  But I expect there will always
be groups too small, diffuse, or reviled to obtain redress for their
real grievances through majoritarian processes.  These groups will
continue to prefer judges whose logic is informed by their sensitivity
to the plight of the dispossessed and underrepresented . . . .  This is
all speculation, of course; nevertheless, it is a surmise deserving of
consideration.2
And lest this view be considered a license for lawless judging, Judge
Cudahy continued:
* This Essay was prepared for the DePaul Law Review Symposium, And Justice For All: A
Symposium In Memory of the Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, April 7, 2017.
** Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
Law clerk to Judge Cudahy, 1983-1984.
1. Richard D. Cudahy, Justice Brennan: The Heart Has its Reasons, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 93
(1988).
2. Id. at 102.
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The ultimate check, however, upon the passions, intuitions and
emotions of one judge is the same faculties of another judge.  That
is why there is appellate review.  It also explains why those review-
ing courts always contain more than one member.  . . . In the long
run Justice Brennan’s approach, acknowledging passion’s role in the
process, enhances justice by excising the unreality, or even the hy-
pocrisy, of an approach that purports to be grounded in pure
reason.3
Most cases before the Seventh Circuit during Judge Cudahy’s long
tenure involved relatively simple legal and factual disputes that pro-
vided little opportunity for philosophical contemplation of the role of
the decision in the grander scheme of social justice.  When that rare
case presented itself, Judge Cudahy’s instincts and passions led him to
orient the law toward protecting the powerless.  In light of the atten-
tion illegal immigration is currently receiving, it is fitting to look back
on an early decision of Judge Cudahy’s concerning the rights of illegal
immigrants under federal labor law that was affirmed by a relatively
conservative Supreme Court.4
In 1976, the employees of Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Com-
pany voted in favor of union representation.5  The employers chal-
lenged the election on the ground that six of the seven voting
employees were illegal immigrants.6  In 1978, a divided panel of the
Seventh Circuit upheld the bargaining order, with one judge dissent-
ing on the ground that protecting illegal immigrants under federal la-
bor law was inconsistent with federal immigration law.7
The bargaining order did not have its intended effect.  After the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ordered the employers to
bargain with the union, the employers informed the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) that the employees were in the country
illegally.8  The penalties for hiring illegal workers were less harsh at
the time and it was unclear whether an employer had a legal duty to
inform federal authorities if it discovered that its workers were in the
3. Id. at 103–04.
4. See NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 467
U.S. 883 (1984).  The Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that illegal immigrants
were “employees” entitled to the protections of federal labor law.  The Court disagreed, how-
ever, with the generous back pay remedy ordered by Seventh Circuit.
5. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1978).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 361.
8. See NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 599 (7th Cir. 1982) aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
467 U.S. 883 (1984).
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country illegally.9  To avoid possible arrest and deportation, most of
the companies’ employees then left the country on their own.10
The case made its way back to the Seventh Circuit after the NLRB
determined that by informing the INS that their employees were ille-
gal immigrants the employers had constructively discharged them in
retaliation for their pro-union activities in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act.11  In his opinion for the court upholding the
NLRB’s decision, Judge Cudahy observed that illegal immigrants are
often at the mercy of unscrupulous employers:
In fact, in this case as probably in others the immigration laws have
provided an employer with a powerful tool for unfair and oppres-
sive treatment of migrant labor.  The immigration laws have been
conveniently employed to impose the ultimate penalty of discharge
(and deportation or its equivalent) if migrant laborers should have
the effrontery to join a union.12
“Unfair and oppressive treatment of migrant labor,” as Judge Cudahy
put it in his characteristically simple yet eloquent language, remains a
serious problem in the United States.13  Even putting aside the ex-
treme cases, such as victims of human trafficking forced into illegal
sex work or held as virtual slaves in legitimate service industries, there
are still millions of people in the United States whose illegal status
leaves them vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace.  In 2012, the
Obama administration announced a program designed to provide lim-
ited security to some illegal immigrants present in the United States.14
The program, entitled Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA), included two prongs.15  First, in an exercise of traditional
enforcement discretion, the administration announced that it would
not seek to deport illegal immigrants who had entered the United
States as minors and met other specified criteria.16  Second, immi-
grants who qualified for deferred action would also be eligible for doc-
umentation that would allow them to work legally during the period
of deferral.17  Under the program, eligible aliens would be granted a
9. Id. at 892–93.
10. Id. at 887.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 602.
13. Id.
14. Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Janet Napolitano to Comm’r David V. Agui-
lar, Director Alejandro Mayorkas, and Director John Morton (June 15, 2012), available at https:/
/www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-
as-children.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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renewable deferral period of two years.18  In 2014, the Obama admin-
istration expanded DACA and initiated a new program, entitled De-
ferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA), to provide similar
protections to parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.19
These programs were attacked, often quite vociferously, largely on
the ground that the President lacked the power to create them without
a clear legislative basis.  Much as President Harry Truman exceeded
his lawful power when he ordered the Department of Commerce to
seize American steel mills during the Korean War,20 President Barack
Obama was alleged to have exceeded his authority by creating these
programs.  DAPA was challenged in federal court by a group of states
and state officials.  In 2015, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction against the
program.21  This injunction was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit22 and by
an equally divided Supreme Court in 2016.23
One of the major themes of the attacks on the deferred action pro-
grams was that President Obama took a significantly broader view of
presidential power than his predecessors, such that his actions seri-
ously intruded on the province of the legislative branch.  In fact, this
was a widely stated critique of President Obama, but in my view it was
false.  In my lifetime, there have been at least three Presidents who
have been similarly accused of seriously overstepping the bounds of
presidential power: Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W.
Bush.  Historically, however, the President most stridently accused of
tyrannical exercise of executive power was Abraham Lincoln.
It is true that President Obama was very active in some areas, most
notably immigration.  For several reasons, President Obama chose in-
dependent action when previous presidents might have acted with
consent and even support from Congress.  First, he spent most of his
presidency in a divided government.  Second, serious problems con-
fronted the country during his second term, a time when many presi-
dents become more aggressive because their power to influence
Congress is greatly diminished.  Gridlock increased exponentially as
his presidency moved forward.  But more fundamentally, from the
outset of his presidency the opposition vowed to do everything in its
18. Id. at 2–3.
19. Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Jeh Charles Johnson to Comm’r R. Gil Ker-
likowske, Director Leon Rodriguez, and Director Thomas S. Winkowski (Nov. 20, 2014), availa-
ble at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf.
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
22. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
23. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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power to prevent him from accomplishing anything.  The opposition
subjected him to unremitting criticism and accused him of tyranny
every time he tried to accomplish anything.  Something about Presi-
dent Obama provoked such extreme opposition that he had no choice
but to act alone when he thought the national interest demanded
some response to problems that Congress was unwilling to address.
Something.
The only other President so stridently opposed from the outset was
Abraham Lincoln, whose election led some Southern states to secede
from the Union.  One of Abraham Lincoln’s most famous actions was
the Emancipation Proclamation, which was viewed as one of the most
tyrannical actions he took.24  The Proclamation, issued in 1862, pur-
ported to free all slaves held in the rebellious states, but not in the
slave states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri that had
remained in the Union.25  It also invited slaves to escape and join the
Union Army, promising that the Fugitive Slave Act would not be
enforced.26
There are striking parallels between Barack Obama’s deferred ac-
tion programs and Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, in
terms of the problems they confronted, their aspirations, and reactions
to them.  This Essay is an exploration of some of those parallels and
an analysis of the litigation challenging the deferred action programs
on the basis that President Obama exceeded the bounds of presiden-
tial power by establishing them.  The Essay means to show respect for
Judge Cudahy’s admonition that the law should be sensitive to “unfair
or oppressive treatment” of “groups too small, diffuse, or reviled to
obtain redress for their real grievances through majoritarian
processes.”27
24. President Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) (National
Archives Identifier: 299998).
25. Id.
26. See id. (“I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated
States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive govern-
ment of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize
and maintain the freedom of said persons. . . . And I further declare and make known, that such
persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to
garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said ser-
vice.”).  The British took similar actions in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.  Slaves
were urged to escape and fight on the side of the British in exchange for a promise of freedom
after the war.  In both cases, the British honored this promise and brought escaped slaves to
freedom in England or elsewhere.  Francis Scott Key referred to this in the third stanza of his
poem “The Star-Spangled Banner,” writing during the War of 1812 that “[n]o refuge could save
the hireling and slave [f]rom the terror of flight or the gloom of the grave.”
27. Cudahy, supra note 1, at 102.
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I. SLAVERY AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
It might seem that any attempt to analogize slaves to illegal immi-
grants should fail.  After all, slaves were considered the property of
their masters, while illegal immigrants are generally free agents who
chose to come to the United States without legal permission.  For a
variety of reasons, the analogy is more appropriate than might appear
at first glance.
The illegal immigrants initially targeted for deferral of deportation
by President Obama’s first program were brought here as minors.
Most came to the United States as young children in the care of their
parents and had no choice or agency in the decision to emigrate.
These people, referred to as dreamers, based on the DREAM Act
that was proposed as a path to legal status, are just as innocent as the
African children taken by slavecatchers in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries or the babies born to slave parents in the New World.
Once in this country, illegal immigrants find themselves in circum-
stances similar to those faced by the slaves.  Immigrants’ lives are se-
verely limited by legal restrictions on their access to education,
healthcare, and government benefits of all kinds.  Like slave families
that could be torn apart at any time, illegal immigrants and their fami-
lies are helpless to prevent the authorities from separating them
through arrest, detention, and deportation.  Illegal immigrants live in
a constant state of insecurity, never knowing when the authorities will
catch them.
Despite the DACA and DAPA programs, this insecurity was a seri-
ous problem during the Obama administration, due to the increase in
immigration enforcement aimed at immigrants with criminal records.
Although the numbers are disputed,28 it seems the pace of deporta-
28. Removals were undoubtedly high during the Obama administration, but less formal immi-
gration enforcement at the border, traditionally called “returns” were lower. See Jessica
Vaughan, ICE Deportations Hit 10-Year Low, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Jan. 2017),
http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/jmv-enforcement-stats-1-17_0.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).  Ap-
parently, this was because fewer people crossed the border illegally during the Obama years than
during previous administrations. Id.  If all returns and removals are counted, the numbers under
Obama appear low when compared to other recent Presidents. See id. (“[T]he number of bor-
der-crossers (and probably the number of recidivists) is much less now than was the case under
the Bush and Clinton administrations, and that is probably the main reason total deportations
are lower; but the Obama administration simply could explain that, rather than try to artificially
manufacture a record by cherry-picking one type of deportation to count”).  Vaughan character-
izes returns at the border and removals pursuant to more formal process as “deportations.” Id.
Vaughan’s study credits the Reagan administration with more than eight million deportations
while the Washington Post, also relying on statistics from the Department of Homeland Security,
reports that only 170,000 people were deported during the Reagan years. See Max Ehrenfreund,
This is Pretty Awkward for People Who Criticize Donald Trump’s Immigration Plans, WASH.
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tions and voluntary departures was high during the entire Obama
presidency.  More recently, the insecurity appears to be increasing as
the Trump administration is conducting immigration raids against
targets that were largely left alone under President Obama.  For ex-
ample, there are reports that people are being taken into detention
when they apply for legal status29 and that large numbers of illegal
immigrants who have not committed serious offenses have been de-
tained under the new administration.30
The exploitation of illegal immigrants in the workplace may not be
as severe as that faced by slaves, who were often worked to death,
beaten, and sexually abused by their masters, but it is nevertheless a
serious problem.  Illegal immigrants are virtually powerless to prevent
employers from violating wage and hour requirements such as mini-
mum wage laws and overtime provisions.  Employers of illegal immi-
grants are free to disregard rules regarding worker safety and often do
not provide workers’ compensation insurance, which means that ille-
gal immigrants do not receive compensation for workplace injuries.
Illegal immigrant employees cannot go to the authorities to complain
about sexual harassment that is reportedly ubiquitous in some
workplaces.31
The current controversy over sanctuary cities raises another parallel
between slavery and illegal immigration.  Sanctuary cities are cities in
which officials have vowed not to enforce federal immigration laws
against illegal immigrants.  For example, police in sanctuary cities will
not inform the federal immigration authorities if they learn that some-
one stopped for a minor issue, such as a traffic violation, is an illegal
immigrant.32  The motivation behind the sanctuary city movement is
POST (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/15/an-inconve-
nient-truth-for-liberals-about-donald-trumps-deportation-plan/?utm_term=.F8712b6a3deb.
29. Maria Cramer, ICE Arrested 7 People as They Sought Permanent Status in Mass., R.I.,
BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/02/21/january-ice-ar-
rested-people-they-sought-permanent-status-mass-and-rhode-island/EE4jLM6HkytwrHDUjY
pdqL/story.html.
30. Andrew Khouri & Geoffrey Mohan, ICE Audits Bring ‘Stress and Anxiety’, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2018, Business at 1 (“[U]nder Trump, who railed against legal and illegal immi-
gration during the 2016 campaign and his presidency, ICE agents have become more willing
to arrest anyone in the country illegally whom they encounter during enforcement actions, even
if those people have no criminal convictions.”).
31. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Injustice on Our Plates: Immigrant Women in the U.S.
Food Industry, 41–52 (2010), available at https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_
files/downloads/publication/Injustice_on_Our_Plates.pdf).
32. In Boston, for example, the city’s “Trust Act” prohibits police from informing federal
authorities about a person’s immigration status unless the federal government has a warrant for
their arrest or the person has a “serious criminal history.” See Travis Andersen, Boston Police
Rebuffing ICE Detainer Requests, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
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not only based on the desire to help immigrants avoid detention and
deportation, although moral outrage is certainly a motivating factor.
Local government officials are also concerned that if illegal immi-
grants do not call the police for fear of deportation they will be vul-
nerable to victimization by criminals.  In communities with large
immigrant populations this could pose a serious threat to law and
order.
There was similar state and local resistance to the enforcement of
federal slavery laws.  Some northern cities provided sanctuary to fugi-
tive slaves, and citizens often resisted the efforts of federal, state, and
local officials to enforce federal laws that required the return of fugi-
tive slaves.  Recent reports compare today’s sanctuary cities to the co-
operation of citizens of Lowell, Massachusetts with the city’s
government to protect fugitive slaves.33  The network of safe houses
and secret routes to Canada known as the Underground Railroad
functioned with the knowledge and even support of some state and
local authorities.  Several states even passed “Personal Liberty Laws,”
which were ultimately held unconstitutional by the United States Su-
preme Court.34  These laws prohibited the state’s officials from assist-
ing in the enforcement of federal fugitive slave laws, generally
nullifying the Fugitive Slave Acts in that state.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions has threatened to withhold federal
law enforcement funds from cities that refuse to enforce federal immi-
gration laws.35  This threat, a milder version of that which was made
during the Obama administration, reportedly led New York City to
begin informing federal authorities when illegal immigrants are sched-
uled to appear in criminal court.36  Under well-established constitu-
tional principles, state and local authorities cannot be compelled to
metro/2018/02/28/boston-police-rebuffing-ice-detainer-requests/IFcxjA9QIye5RXwY5NRWAJ/
story.html.
33. See, e.g., Robert Forrant, Brave Hearts: When Lowell Was a Sanctuary City—For Fugitive
Slaves, WBUR.ORG: COGNOSCENTI (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2017/03/30/
fugitive-slave-law-lowell-sanctuary-cities-robert-forrant.
34. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859).
35. See Joseph Tanfani & Patrick McGreevy, “Sanctuary Cities” Warned to Cooperate, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, April 22, 2017, at 1.
36. It is not clear if this is true.  One critic, George Washington University law professor John
Banzahf claims that it is. See John Banzahf, Following Sessions’ Threat, NYC No Longer a Sanc-
tuary City, VALUEWALK (Apr. 2, 2017), http://www.valuewalk.com/2017/04/nyc-ice-sanctuary-cit
ies-nypd/.  However, the New York Times reports that New York City is not fully cooperative
with federal immigration officials and, for example, did not honor a single federal detainer re-
quest in 2017. See Liz Robbins, Even in a ‘Sanctuary City,’ Immigrants Risk Being Deported,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2018, at A28 (“ICE issued 1,526 detainer requests to the New York Police
Department in the 2017 fiscal year, up from 80 in 2016. The Police Department complied with
none of them.”).
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enforce federal law.  However, Congress can place conditions on the
receipt of federal funds.  For example, in the 1970s, most states
adopted the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit in response to a fed-
eral law that would have withheld federal highway funding if they did
not.37  The conditions must be voluntarily accepted by the state and
local authorities.  This means they must be clearly part of the federal
law providing the funds (so the states are aware that by accepting the
federal funds they are agreeing to the conditions), and the loss of fed-
eral funds must not be so substantial that the state and local authori-
ties are effectively coerced into complying with the conditions.38
Further, the federal conditions must be related to the purposes of the
federal funding.
It is unclear whether the connection between federal law enforce-
ment funds and state and local enforcement of immigration laws satis-
fies these conditions.  Challenges to the conditions may depend on the
magnitude of the withholding.  If the potentially-withheld federal
funds constitute a large percentage of state and local law enforcement
budgets, a court might view the threat as coercive, in much the same
way that the Supreme Court determined that the Affordable Care
Act’s threat to withhold Medicaid funding from states that refused to
expand that program was unconstitutionally coercive.39
It is no answer to the sanctuary city movement to simply declare
that it is unlawful for state and local governments to refuse to follow
federal immigration laws or assist in their enforcement.  The establish-
ment of sanctuary cities, both during slavery and today, is a dramatic
example of the difficulty presented by laws that are viewed as immoral
by large segments of society.  Even though every aspect of the institu-
tion of slavery was deeply immoral, the law was clearly on its side.
With regard to state and local efforts to provide sanctuary to escaped
slaves, the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause was understood to em-
power the federal government to enlist the aid of state and local au-
thorities in returning escaped slaves to their masters.  The Fugitive
Slave Acts allowed for the seizure of alleged fugitive slaves without
trial, which resulted in the enslavement of numerous free persons of
African descent in the United States.40  Although slaves would have
been morally justified in taking extreme measures, perhaps including
37. See The Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974, 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
38. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).  However, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974 even though states not adopting the national
speed limit could lose 95% of their federal highway aid. See State of Nevada v. Skinner, 884
F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1988).
39. Nat’l Fed’n of Independent Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
40. See, e.g., SOLOMON NORTHRUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE (David Wilson ed., 1853).
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homicide, to gain their freedom, the law—or local whites acting in lieu
of legal process—certainly would have punished them severely.
It is also no answer to claim that the analogy between slaves and
illegal immigrants does not work because slaves were owned by their
masters while illegal immigrants are free.  The premise does not hold.
No matter what the law says, no person can ever truly own another
person.  The essence of humanity is the independent consciousness of
each human being.  It is what allowed people to survive and maintain
the spark of humanity during the horrors of slavery, in the concentra-
tion camps of World War II, and in the depths of terrible poverty and
deprivation.  It is what allows illegal immigrants to maintain their
hope and dignity in the face of the great difficulties caused by the
insecurity inherent in their lack of legal status.  What masters owned
under the system of chattel slavery was a license, provided by their
government, to treat other people as if they were property.  They had
an entitlement provided by the government to kidnap, imprison, and
force people to labor with only the most minimal restrictions on dan-
gerous and inhumane conditions.  They had an entitlement to destroy
their victims’ families and social structures, deprive them of their dig-
nity, rape them, and deny them the basic human rights recognized in
all civilized societies.  To a much greater degree, they had government
permission to treat the enslaved the way society often treats illegal
immigrants.
II. DEFERRED ACTION PROGRAMS41
The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have great dis-
cretion over enforcement of immigration laws, especially when decid-
ing who to target for detention and removal.  For more than fifty years
immigration authorities have formalized their discretionary enforce-
ment decisions in programs known as “deferred action” or “tempo-
rary protected status.”42   As the name implies, deferred action
constitutes a discretionary decision to defer adverse action, such as
deportation of a class of immigrants who meet stated criteria.
41. Both programs described here have been rescinded by the Trump administration.  The
DACA program was rescinded on September 5, 2017, with a six-month grace period allowing
renewal for those whose permits would expire during the six-month window.  The DAPA
program was rescinded on June 16, 2017.  Memorandum on Rescission of DACA, 82 Fed. Reg.
43556 (Sept. 5, 2017).  Due to legal challenges described below, DAPA never actually went into
effect.
42. See generally  The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 2, 3–5 (2014) (describing history of deferred action programs in immigration).
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In 2012, Janet Napolitano, the Secretary of Homeland Security for
the Obama administration, issued a memorandum creating a new de-
ferred action program—DACA.43  Secretary Napolitano relied explic-
itly on prosecutorial discretion and established five criteria that illegal
immigrants must meet to be considered for deferred action: (1) The
immigrant must have come to the United States when he or she was
under the age of sixteen; (2) the immigrant must have resided in the
United States for at least five years and be in the United States when
applying; (3) the immigrant must be in school, have graduated from
school or obtained a GED, or be an honorably discharged veteran; (4)
the immigrant must not have been convicted of serious criminal of-
fenses, multiple misdemeanors, or be a threat to national security or
public safety; and (5) the immigrant must be thirty years old or
younger.44
The memorandum implied that even if the immigrant satisfies all of
these criteria, the Department of Homeland Security retains discre-
tion to deny deferred action; however, it was not clear when that dis-
cretion would be exercised.  Successful applicants for deferred action
are also eligible to apply for renewable two-year periods of work au-
thorization during the period of deferred action.  But again, there is
no guarantee that all successful applicants will be granted work
authorization.
In 2014, new Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson re-
vamped and expanded the deferred action program in a new memo-
randum by including illegal immigrant parents of U.S. citizens and
parents of lawful permanent residents.45  With regard to parents, the
new program, known as DAPA, contains six criteria: (1) The immi-
grant must have a child who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resi-
dent; (2) the immigrant must have continuously resided in the United
States since January 1, 2010; (3) the immigrant must be physically pre-
sent in the United States both on the date of the memorandum and at
the time the request for deferred action is made; (4) the immigrant
must not have lawful status on the date of the memorandum; (5) the
immigrant must not be an enforcement priority under another memo-
randum issued on November 20, 2014;46 (6) the immigrant must “pre-
sent no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the
43. Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Janet Napolitano, supra note 14.
44. Id.
45. Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 19.
46. This memorandum detailed the Department’s enforcement priorities, focusing primarily
on criminal conduct and repeated unlawful entry and detention.
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grant of deferred action inappropriate.”47  This last criterion means
that the grant of deferred action remains discretionary.
The 2014 memorandum also expanded the preexisting DACA pro-
gram by removing the age cap for applicants, while retaining the re-
quirement that the immigrant seeking deferral  arrived in the United
States before the age of sixteen.  It also expanded eligibility by ex-
tending the cut-off date for illegal entry to January 1, 2010, and it
lengthened the period of possible work authorization to three-year re-
newable increments.
It is perfectly understandable that the Department of Homeland Se-
curity would want to formulate and employ immigration enforcement
criteria given that there are an estimated 11 to 12 million people in the
country illegally.  Most of the 4 million people eligible for relief under
DACA and DAPA are not likely to be deported anytime soon.48  With
thousands of federal employees involved in immigration enforcement,
operating under stated criteria is superior to giving individual agents
complete discretion.  Work authorization for illegal immigrants also
makes sense.  We are all better off if illegal immigrants pay taxes, ob-
tain driver’s licenses and insurance, and become less likely to be vic-
timized by unscrupulous employers who feel they can get away with
paying illegal immigrants less than the minimum wage.  In short, as a
policy matter, the deferred action programs are a bandage on the
problems caused by Congress’s unwillingness to pass comprehensive
immigration reform that would take a more realistic view of the con-
sequences of having millions of people in the country illegally.
The most legally vulnerable aspect of DACA and DAPA are the
provisions that allow successful applicants to be granted permission to
work legally during the three-year period of deportation deferral.  The
Department of Homeland Security’s creation of applications and issu-
ance of permits goes well beyond what is traditionally thought of as
simply exercising enforcement discretion.  While there are statutes
that authorize the Attorney General to grant work permission to oth-
erwise undocumented persons deemed “lawfully present” during peri-
ods of deferral,49 some aspects of the statutory structure indicate that
this authorization is narrower than that applied by the Obama admin-
istration.  Although it is not clearly illegal, it is also not clearly legal.
47. Id.
48. Even if the new administration steps up the pace, it is still unlikely that a significant num-
ber of those eligible for deferred action will be deported.  Rather, deportations are likely to be
focused on recent arrivals, people with criminal records and those who are thought to pose a
threat to the security of the United States.
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (c)(14).
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If Congress disagrees with this aspect of deferred action, it should leg-
islate an end to the work authorization, which it clearly could do.  Be-
cause Congress has not agreed to a solution, the issue has been
brought to federal courts.
III. WHY CHALLENGES DO NOT BELONG IN COURT
After President Obama announced the DAPA program and the ex-
pansion of DACA, suits were filed challenging the programs’ legal-
ity.50  One suit, brought by notorious former-Sheriff Joseph Arpaio of
Maricopa County, Arizona, was dismissed by Federal District Judge
Beryl Howell for lack of standing.51  However, in another suit,
brought by several states and state governors in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas, the court held that the
State of Texas had standing because, inter alia, under state law it was
required to issue driver’s licenses to any person whose application
under DAPA was granted by the federal government.52  On the mer-
its, the district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, deter-
mining that the challengers were likely to succeed on their claim that
the Administrative Procedure Act requires notice and comment
before implementation of the program.  The district court did not rule
on the challengers’ more substantive claim, that the deferred action
programs violated the President’s constitutional duty to “take care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”53  But the injunction based on
the Administrative Procedure Act was sufficient to halt the program.
A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court’s issu-
ance of the preliminary injunction.  This set the stage for Supreme
Court review.  At the Supreme Court, the House of Representatives
filed an amicus curiae brief urging affirmance.  However, after the
death of Justice Antonin Scalia, with the Court’s membership equally
divided between Democrats and Republicans, the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion was affirmed by an equally divided court and the case was re-
turned to the district court for proceedings on whether to make the
preliminary injunction permanent.54  Now that the Trump administra-
tion has eliminated both DACA and DAPA the litigation challenging
50. Although the challenges were in effect to aspects of both programs, because the suits were
prompted by the creation of the DAPA program, this essay will refer to DAPA litigation.  These
references are meant to encompass the entire breadth of the litigation.
51. See Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 190, 192 (D.D.C. 2014).
52. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 617–19, 624, aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015).
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5.
54. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
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the programs is over, but has been replaced by several challenges to
the legality of the rescission of DACA.55
Putting the merits aside, allowing challenges to be litigated in fed-
eral court goes against the weight of authority and tradition.  The
DAPA litigation was a political dispute between the President and the
Republican Party and does not belong in federal court.  Rather, it be-
longs in the halls of Congress.  There are at least four reasons that
support this conclusion.
The first problem with this litigation is standing.  DAPA did not
cause the plaintiffs the sort of injury traditionally required for stand-
ing to challenge government action in federal court.  Texas’s main
claim, which was accepted by the Fifth Circuit, was that under Texas
law it was required to bear the expense of issuing driver’s licenses to
all successful DAPA applicants.56  This is a bizarre basis for standing.
It is a self-inflicted injury that could easily be remedied by Texas itself.
Under the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, anyone can manufacture
standing to challenge government action merely by making a revoca-
ble commitment to incur an expensive obligation if the government
takes the particular action.  This is different from other types of volun-
tary action, like a decision to use a park for recreation which can give
the user standing to challenge threats to the park.  Texas is voluntarily
doing something it claims it does not want to do; users of parks are
doing something they want to do and have a right to do.  The situa-
tions are completely different.
One of the interesting aspects of the DAPA litigation is the unique
position of states vis-a`-vis immigration law.  There have been numer-
ous conflicts between states and the federal government over immi-
gration policy.  This may be best exemplified by the Arizona state law
concerning immigration enforcement that the Supreme Court held
was largely preempted by exclusive federal control over immigra-
tion.57  The Fifth Circuit supported its standing decision with a vague
discussion of the special position of states, which gave up their sover-
eignty over certain matters when the Union under the Constitution of
55. Two of these cases have already reached the Supreme Court, albeit on procedural matters.
In an unsigned order, the Court granted the government’s petition to stay the enforcement of
district court discovery orders in a challenge to the rescission of DACA brought, inter alia, by
former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, who is now President of the Univer-
sity of California. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017) (mem).  More recently, the
Court denied the government’s request that it review a district court decision enjoining the elim-
ination of DACA before the Court of Appeals had completed its review. See also Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 17-1003, 138 S. Ct. 1182 (Feb. 26, 2018).
56. See Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 617–19, 624, aff’d 809 F.3d 134.
57. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012).
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1789 was formed.58  According to the Court of Appeals, because of
this, states should receive “special solicitude” when a court is evaluat-
ing standing for claims challenging federal action.59  But according to
the Supreme Court, the states have no legitimate role in immigration
law or policy.60
In this regard, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is in serious tension with
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning state standing.  The
court relied upon the Supreme Court’s discussion of the issue in a case
brought by the State of Massachusetts challenging the federal govern-
ment’s failure to regulate gases that contribute to global warming.61
But despite that decision’s discussion of the special position of states,
the basis for Massachusetts’ standing was the rather traditional injury
of erosion of state coastal property.62  Certainly, the Fifth Circuit’s
standing theory is contrary to the conservative position, as stated by
Chief Justice Roberts in his Massachusetts v. E.P.A. dissent, that such
disputes are more appropriately resolved in a political forum because
the injuries alleged are too widespread and speculative to support
standing.63
In fact, the standing problem presented by this litigation is a famil-
iar one.  There are many situations in which no one has standing to
challenge a government decision to grant someone a benefit.  For ex-
ample, no one has standing to challenge an allegedly erroneous deci-
sion to grant citizenship, a green card, or a non-exclusive welfare or
social security benefit to someone else.  Grants of some government
permits may be challenged, for example building permits may be chal-
lenged by abutters64 and permission to engage in a business may be
challenged by competitors who can show injury.65  Perhaps a union
representing displaced workers would have standing to challenge the
grant of work authorization, but it would have to prove that union
jobs were actually threatened by the newly legalized workers.  How-
ever, in many cases there is simply no one with standing to take the
government to court over the grant of a benefit to someone else.
58. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 151–52.
59. See id. at 151.
60. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416.
61. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
62. Id. at 518–519.
63. Id. at 535–45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
64. See 81 Spooner Road, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 461 Mass. 692, 964
N.E.2d 318 (2012) (rebuttable presumption that abutter has standing to challenge zoning
decision).
65. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (granting
standing to competitors challenging grant of permission to banks to provide data processing
services to their customers).
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Related to the standing issues for DAPA challenges, there are more
general reasons why Chief Justice Roberts is correct that disputes like
this do not belong in court.  This was a political dispute that should
have been resolved in Congress, where the states are well-repre-
sented.   There is a long history of back and forth between Congress
and the Executive Branch when the interpretation or application of
the immigration laws is at issue.  The Executive Branch has broad dis-
cretion in immigration enforcement, unless Congress has explicitly
foreclosed that discretion.  No law prohibited the DAPA program.  It
may be that the President was reading his authority under existing
immigration laws too broadly, but in the immigration area when ad-
ministrations have done this, Congress has passed legislation estab-
lishing explicit limits to executive power.66  If Congress disagreed with
the President’s exercise of discretion, it should have passed an amend-
ment to the immigration laws or an appropriations rider to prevent
execution of the DAPA program rather than simply filing a brief in
the Supreme Court.
Appropriations riders are an effective means of preventing agency
action with which Congress disagrees.  For example, for several years
Congress used appropriations riders to prevent the Clinton adminis-
tration’s Department of Labor from regulating ergonomic injuries to
workers.67  The problem here is that the Republican majority in Con-
gress could not come to a consensus on the appropriate reaction to the
DAPA program.  Perhaps Members of Congress were concerned that
if they prevented DAPA, they would have harmed their party’s pros-
pects in future elections because many voters are keenly interested in
immigration reform.  For whatever reason, the House of Representa-
tives turned to the federal courts to do its dirty work, thereby asking
the federal courts to violate principles of judicial restraint that are
usually espoused by conservatives.
66. See Adam B. Cox & Christina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 474–76, 480, 482 (2009).   The House of Representatives, in its brief Amicus
Curiae in United States v. Texas presses this point as a reason to reject the DAPA and DACA
programs, but the point provides support for the notion that Congress should have passed legis-
lation against DAPA and DACA rather than filed a brief against it. See Brief for the United
States House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29–30, United
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) [hereinafter Brief for the United States
House of Representatives] (“[Petitioners] conveniently relegate to footnotes any mention of the
many instances in which Congress has curtailed—or even eliminated—the very forms of discre-
tion on which they rely.”).
67. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 85–89
(2006) (discussion of appropriations riders generally and the rider on ergonomic injuries in
particular).
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The third reason that this dispute did not belong in federal court
relates to the characterization in the House’s brief that the President
was facilitating illegal conduct by millions of illegal immigrants.68  If
this allegation was true, the House’s remedy is explicitly provided for
in the Constitution—“impeachment.”69  Any President who facilitates
lawbreaking by millions of people deserves to be impeached and the
members of the House who voted to submit the brief amicus curiae to
the Supreme Court may have had a constitutional duty to seek im-
peachment.  Their failure to do so leads to the question of whether
they really believed what their brief stated.  Perhaps they did, but they
also did not want to suffer the political consequences of seeking im-
peachment, especially after the discord created by their failed attempt
to remove President Clinton from office for lying under oath about his
sex life.
The fourth reason the DAPA dispute does not belong in federal
court is that there is no effective remedy that any federal court can
order to prevent the administration from deferring deportation of the
people who would be eligible for relief under DAPA.  Under familiar
principles of administrative law, again championed largely by conserv-
atives, especially the late Justice Scalia, no federal court would order
an unwilling Executive Branch to deport anyone eligible for deferred
status under DAPA.  Any such order would require radical changes to
administrative law under which the courts assume a supervisory role
over the President’s fulfillment of his duty to “take care that laws are
faithfully executed.”70  It is well understood, and argued for most vo-
ciferously by Justice Scalia, that the choice of enforcement targets is
allocated by the Constitution to the President and not to Congress or
the courts.71  DAPA is not so clearly illegal that it should provoke a
court to take the unprecedented step of ordering the Executive
Branch to deport a category of people it would prefer not to.  This
would be an unprecedented assertion of judicial power over Executive
Branch policy.  Unless a statute clearly requires agency enforcement
against a particular target, any remedy that would order the Executive
Branch to deport anyone would be a serious violation of basic princi-
ples of separation of powers.
68. The House’s brief characterized DAPA as “authoriz[ing] more than 4 million individuals
to violate those laws on a prospective basis.”  Brief of the United States House of Representa-
tives, supra note 66, at 22.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5.
71. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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In addition to these reasons supporting my conclusion that the fed-
eral courts are the wrong forum for contesting DAPA, there is a sim-
ple substantive reason why the President’s view should have
prevailed: the Executive Branch has discretionary power over the en-
forcement of the immigration laws to determine in advance that it will
not deport people in certain categories.  Unless Congress makes de-
portation mandatory for a class of people, it is well within traditional
presidential discretion to choose how to deploy the limited resources
allocated to enforcing the immigration laws.  Additionally, there is
nothing constitutionally suspect about announcing, in advance, the ad-
ministration’s enforcement priorities or in giving people a document
certifying that they are in a non-priority category.  In fact, advance
notice of a categorical determination facilitates fairness and a more
orderly system of administration of the laws.
Although it does not make a legal difference, discomfort with my
view would be understandable if the Obama administration had basi-
cally shirked its responsibility to enforce the law.  By no means was
the Obama administration lax when it came to immigration enforce-
ment, and no one expects the Trump administration to slow down ei-
ther.  In this era of high government debt, the Obama administration,
in some years, reportedly deported more people than were deported
in the entire eight years of the Reagan administration.72   Given the
enormity of the Obama deportation machine, it made sense for the
government to develop and announce a clear set of priorities and cre-
ate a mechanism to ensure proper and humane administration of the
program.  As a matter of administrative law, it is usually better for the
government to explicitly state and apply clear rules pertaining to the
exercise of its authority than to leave it to ad hoc judgments that may
lead to inconsistent and arbitrary application.
72. See FY 2016 ICE Immigration Removals, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.ice.gov/
removal-statistics/2016 (last updated Dec. 5, 2017).  A table in this report indicates that annual
removals during the Obama administration ranged from about 235,000 to a high of over more
than 400,000.  By contrast, during the George W. Bush administration, a total of approximately 2
million people were removed, for an average of approximately 250,000.  Detailed statistics on
immigration enforcement dating back to 1996 are available on the Department of Homeland
Security’s website. See Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).  By one count,
the total number of people deported during the Reagan administration was 170,000, although
another report puts the number much higher, at above 8 million. See Ehrenfreund, supra note
28; but see Vaughan, supra note 28.
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IV. THE OVERBLOWN CONTROVERSY AND THE EMANCIPATION
PROCLAMATION
In my view, the controversy over President Obama’s DAPA and
DACA programs was seriously overblown.  The reaction seemed to
relate more to the opposition’s determination to oppose anything that
President Obama attempted to accomplish than the merits of the par-
ticular program.  There was something about President Obama that
provoked opposition more extreme than to any President since Abra-
ham Lincoln.  Something.
One reason for the particularly vociferous reaction was that the
programs highlighted the inability of Congress to do anything about
the nation’s festering immigration problems.  Congress is the least
popular federal government institution with approval ratings below
twenty percent, and its inability to pass immigration reform certainly
contributes to its poor reputation.  President Obama was not shy
about blaming Congress for his decision to act unilaterally, which
likely did not dispose Congress to support the President’s immigration
policy.  The focus on President Obama’s illegal usurpation of Con-
gress’s legislative prerogatives may have also served to distract the
public from Congress’s own failings.
In the House’s amicus curaie brief to the Supreme Court, one of the
major themes was that President Obama’s seizure of power was an
unprecedented step toward Executive tyranny.73  This was a theme
echoed by many politicians and commentators who opposed President
Obama during his eight years in office.  Our collective, but short, po-
litical memory barely recalls that similar charges were levelled against
Richard Nixon when he froze wages and prices and impounded con-
gressionally appropriated funds; Ronald Reagan when he established
centralized review of administrative rulemaking and illegally sold
arms to Iran to illegally fund the Contras in Nicaragua; and George
W. Bush, for his exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief in
the War on Terror.  Remember that the President thought of as per-
haps the most tyrannical in our history was Abraham Lincoln.  His
killer famously shouted “sic semper tyrannis” (“thus with all tyrants”)
after shooting him.74  And what was President Lincoln’s greatest of-
fense?  His issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, which pur-
ported to free slaves held by those in rebellion against the United
73. Brief for the House of Representatives, supra note 66, at 14–15 (“The extraordinary con-
ception of executive power that petitioners press exceeds the outermost limits of law, logic, and
the Constitution.”).
74. See DAVID H. DONALD, LINCOLN 597 (1995).
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States.75  Of course, because it did not apply to any states still in the
Union, that proclamation did not actually free very many slaves.  That
took another year of Civil War and an amendment righting one of the
great constitutional wrongs in the history of the United States.
Lincoln issued the proclamation on September 22, 1862, to take ef-
fect on January 1, 1863 if the Southern states did not end their rebel-
lion by then.76  He then reissued it on January 1, 1863.77  The
Proclamation purported to free all slaves held in the rebellious states,
not in the slave states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri
that had remained in the Union.78  It also invited slaves to escape and
join the Union Army, and ordered the United States government to
treat these slaves as free, which implicitly promised that the Fugitive
Slave Law would not be enforced.
There are important parallels between the Emancipation Proclama-
tion and President Obama’s executive actions on immigration.  Lin-
coln did not have the backing of Congress for his Proclamation.  He
claimed unilateral power to issue it as a war-related measure author-
ized by his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces during
the Civil War.79  The Proclamation itself freed very few slaves—only
those in rebel territory that had already been taken by Union forces—
and even among rebel territories some exceptions were made for ar-
eas already under firm Union control, such as areas in southern Loui-
siana including New Orleans.  But it had tremendous symbolic impact
and boosted the morale of Blacks North and South who could see
emancipation on the horizon, however distant.
Similarly, President Obama did not enjoy Congress’s backing when
he took action to address the status of the millions of law-abiding ille-
gal immigrants living and working in the United States.  Just as Presi-
dent Lincoln implicitly promised not to enforce the Fugitive Slave
Acts against slaves who escaped rebel territory, President Obama
promised to forego enforcement of the immigration laws against a
class of illegal immigrants.  Both Presidents employed the power of
the federal government to extend freedom, security, dignity, and op-
75. Evidence for the Unpopular Mr. Lincoln, CIVIL WAR TRUST, http://www.civilwar.org/hal-
lowed-ground-magazine/unpopular-mr-lincoln.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
76. Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 24.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. DONALD, supra note 74, at 456–57; Lincoln stated in the Proclamation that it was issued
“by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the
United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the
United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion.”  Emanci-
pation Proclamation, supra note 24.
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portunity to some of the most vulnerable people in the country.  Both
were greeted by vehement denunciations, based largely on the view
that they overstepped the bounds of their power by acting without
congressional support.
One of the key parallels between the Emancipation Proclamation
and Obama’s deferred action program is that both claim a strong basis
in morality.  By 1863, there was a Northern consensus that slavery was
a deeply immoral institution.  The enslaved were denied any sem-
blance of humanity.  They had no control over their lives and no hope
of realizing any ambitions they might develop in their degraded state.
Their social and family structures were subject to destruction at the
whim of their masters.  Hopelessness and despair dominated their ex-
perience in the United States.
President Obama’s deferred action programs are founded on a simi-
lar moral concern for illegal immigrants.  People who were brought or
sent to the United States as children are as blameless as the African
men, women, and children who ended up here because of the slave
trade.  They all suffer from a similar lack of basic security and free-
dom to develop their human potential that was experienced by slaves
and therefore cannot reach their emotional, intellectual, or economic
potential.  They are in constant fear of having their families ripped
apart by apparently capricious decisions concerning which among the
millions of illegal immigrants will be targeted for deportation.
President Obama’s immigration actions also made good policy
sense.  Assuming that most of the people eligible for relief under
DAPA or DACA are not likely to be deported, the question is
whether American society is better off with them living in the shadows
or allowing them to come out into the open.  By and large, the answer
to this question should be obvious.  Allowing people to work and at-
tend school openly is much better for all concerned, except perhaps
for unscrupulous employers who would like to continue to take ad-
vantage of illegal immigrants.  Just as the end of slavery should have
created opportunities for other workers, less workplace exploitation
should mean higher wages and better working conditions for all work-
ers, legal and illegal.  Further, there is serious concern that official
hostility toward illegal immigrants makes them less likely to report
criminal activity, which harms all of society.
Unlike the Emancipation Proclamation, DACA had immediate ef-
fects and DAPA would have had similar effects had the federal courts
not prevented its implementation.  DAPA, right now, could improve
the lives of countless people who otherwise contribute positively to
American society.  It would free more people than the Emancipation
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Proclamation, if only the federal courts, and the House of Representa-
tives, would leave it alone.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
Given the decades of inaction on immigration reform, it is risky to
predict a happy ending to the problem of illegal immigration in the
United States.  Under the current administration, an increased focus
on border security is likely, whether or not the wall along the border
with Mexico is built, with or without Mexican financing.  The Trump
administration’s revocation of DACA and DAPA surprised no one.
Further, some recent immigration enforcement raids indicate the new
administration is targeting people who would most likely have been
left alone under the prior administration.  These raids include highly
publicized arrests at courthouses and facilities where illegal immi-
grants have gone to apply for legalization.
Progress for the millions of illegal immigrants in the United States
will be hard fought and may suffer serious setbacks before true pro-
gress is made.  Here, again, we see a parallel with slavery.  True free-
dom and equality did not rise out of the ashes of slavery with ease.
Rather, the white establishment in the South fought hard to preserve
as much of the institution as it could.  Once the Reconstruction-era
governments were removed from power through the terroristic activi-
ties of the Ku Klux Klan, the White Leagues, and others, racial op-
pression that rivaled actual slavery quickly developed.80  Terror as
well as legal devices prevented Blacks from voting.  Blacks were ex-
cluded from many professions, could not buy property or operate
businesses in most locations and were, in the main, relegated to the
lowest rung of the economic and social ladder.  They could not freely
sell their labor, but instead were relegated to sharecropping, often
confined to the plantations of their former masters by a white custom
of not hiring others’ former slaves.  Slavery was virtually replicated in
the system of inmate labor, where Blacks arrested for minor offenses
or trumped-up charges like vagrancy and loitering were hired out as
chain gang workers.81
Under the Jim Crow system, Blacks were excluded from many so-
cial institutions and places of business.  Where exclusion was impracti-
cal, although the official policy was “separate but equal,” Blacks were
segregated into inferior public transportation and public accommoda-
80. See ROGER A. FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1862-77 133–57
(1974); NICHOLAS LEHMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR (2006).
81. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974).
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tions.  There are those who claim that even today, the Jim Crow sys-
tem persists in the mass incarceration of young Black men under a
war on drugs that was consciously designed to attack the Black com-
munity.82  Drug convictions have disenfranchised millions of Black
voters, as part of a campaign that includes voter identification laws, to
reduce liberal voting strength.83
Much the same could be said about the fate of illegal immigrants.
Immigration reform has been a long time coming.  In 1986, immigra-
tion reform led to amnesty for perhaps 3 million previously illegal im-
migrants.  However, the flood of new illegal immigrants continued
and shifting political winds have prevented Congress from enacting
anything similar in the past three decades.  DACA and DAPA may
have been flashes of hope, but they are now stalled in much the same
way that progress toward racial equality and dignity for the former
slaves was stalled after Reconstruction.  Senator Alan Simpson, one of
the architects of the 1986 Immigration Act, recognized that the Act
largely failed to stem the flow of illegal immigration, but he viewed it
as at least a partial success: “It’s not perfect, but 2.9 million people
came forward.  If you can bring one person out of an exploited rela-
tionship, that’s good enough for me.”84  Maybe Senator Simpson ex-
aggerates when he says freeing one person from exploitation would be
enough, but 4 million is certainly a step in the right direction.
82. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDEDNESS (2012).
83. Id. at 180–82; Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363 (2015).
84. See A Reagan Legacy: Amnesty For Illegal Immigrants, NPR (July 4, 2010), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128303672.
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